Ruling elites can use the symbolism of major dams to gain legitimacy and bolster a sense of national identity and patriotism. The Rogun dam in Tajikistan is a gigantic hydraulic infrastructure that if and when finished will be the tallest in the world, allowing the country to gain energy self-sufficiency.
Introduction
Research on water and social power (Wittfogel, 1957; Worster 1985; Reisner 1993; Swyngedouw 1999; Giglioli and Swyngedouw 2008) has highlighted how ruling political elites can increase their influence and preserve social control through the realization of large hydraulic infrastructures. So far, however, there has been little discussion about how a ruling elite can use the symbolic value of a large hydraulic project to construct and disseminate its own idea of the nation and legitimize its hold on power. On this regard, the concept of nations as social or cultural constructs seems to fit well within the post-Soviet context, and scholars working on the post-Soviet space (Kuzio 2002; Kolstø 2006; Polese and Wylegala 2008) , and more specifically on Central Asia (Laruelle 2007; Marat 2008; Blakkisrud and Nozimova 2010; Cummings 2010; Roche and Hohmann 2011) , have offered specific examples of how languages, discourses and symbols are used by ruling elites to produce meanings, define the nation and create ideologies.
The present article contributes to this body of research by taking as a case study the Rogun Dam in Tajikistan, and illustrating the rhetorical legitimation strategies used by the Tajik government to frame the dam as a nationally cohesive and patriotic project. Conceived during the golden years of the hydraulic mission of the Soviet administration, Rogun is a gigantic dam on the Vakhsh 1 river that if and when finished, with its 335-meter of height, would be the tallest in the world, giving another record to the country that in 2011 erected the world's tallest flagpole as a symbol of statehood and patriotism (BBC Monitoring 2011b) . The symbolic meaning attached to the Rogun dam, it is argued, can possibly be the key to explaining the Government of Tajikistan's (GoT) insistence over the last twenty years to realize a project that, besides being outdated and too costly to be funded by its national resources alone (Schmidt 2007) , has caused the deterioration of Tajik relations with its neighbors and, in particular, with Uzbekistan. In an effort aimed at persuading its citizens and the international community that the construction of Rogun is a fundamental achievement for the country, the GoT has created what can be defined a "Rogun ideology".
Indeed, the Central Asian political environment seems particularly suitable for observing how the symbolism of a major dam can be used by a ruling elite to produce a national ideology and legitimize its position. This is evident for at least two reasons. First, as Rogers Brubaker (1996, 29) puts it, no other state has gone so far as the Soviet Union "in sponsoring, codifying, institutionalizing, even (in 3 some cases) inventing nationhood and nationality on the sub-state level, while at the same time doing nothing to institutionalize them on the level of the state as a whole." If, on the one hand, such an institutionalized definition of nationhood played a major role in the disintegration of the Soviet state, on the other hand, it has shaped and structured the formation of national identities in successor states (Brubaker 1996) . Second, the void left by the collapse of the Soviet Union led to the birth of what Hobsbawn (1992, 10) would have called invented nations, in which "nationalism comes before
nations." The key contradiction, according to Olivier Roy (2000) , is that the Central Asian states were created during the Soviet period, but their independence came as a result of the end of that period: since Stalin could no longer be the father of the nation, the Central Asian rulers had to re-evaluate or reconstruct their pasts. As Communism could no longer provide a basis for legitimacy to national governments, former Communist leaders took a nationalist turn to enhance the perceived legitimacy of their authority (Mellon 2010 ).
This article also represents an effort to examine how the construction of a national identity can overlap with the construction of a large dam, to the extent that the dam itself becomes a national image.
Major dams 2 are indeed among the largest structures built by humans and are, perhaps, the most spectacular way to tame water resources. Apart from serving practical purposes (e.g. generating electricity, controlling water flows and allowing for irrigated agriculture), dams are also powerful political symbols that can be used to build and reinforce national identities and legitimize those in power (Mitchell 2002 ).
Based on these assumptions, the focus of this study is placed on the Tajik political elite and on their discursive constructions of the Rogun dam at the national as well as at the international level. These two dimensions are interconnected, since the dam can be portrayed as a symbol of progress and success, but it can also be directly related to the rivalry between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan and the assertion of Tajik national interests.
The sources used for the case study include official and non-official documents. The former consist of official texts, such as speeches delivered by the President and his ministers at national and international summits, official statements and government documents; the latter comprise news reports produced by state-owned TV channels -television is still the most important source of information for Tajik citizens 3 -and news agencies, which in Tajikistan are tightly controlled and serve as the mouthpiece of the government (Olcott 2012, 35-38) . Non-official sources serve the purpose of this 4 analysis particularly well, as governments tend to use news reports to construct knowledge and disseminate a particular truth about social events (Cloke et al. 2004, 62-64 
Nation-building and the politics of large dams
As Benedict Anderson (2006, 3) noted, "[n]ation, nationality, nationalism -all have proved notoriously difficult to define, let alone analyse." Hugh Seton Watson (1977, 5) pointed out that "a nation exists when a significant number of people in a community consider themselves to form a nation." Based on its subjective character, the nation is defined as a social or cultural construct with limited spatial and demographic extent, in line with Anderson's (2006) interpretation of the nation as an "imagined political community." Thereby, considering the nation as an immaterial entity does not mean that a nation cannot be constructed or built. Indeed, the concept of nation-building gained prominence in the United States in the 1960s, mostly thanks to the work of Karl Deutsch and William Folz (1963) . The term was chiefly used to describe the greater integration of state and society, as citizenship brought loyalty to the modern nation-states (Dobbins 2003) . Still, the concept has been highly debated, and Polese (2011) observed that there are at least four distinct and incompatible interpretations of the term nation-building that make it difficult to come up with an uncontested definition of the concept. Partially drawing on the definition provided by Kolstø and Blakkisrud (2004, vii) , for the purpose of this paper the term nation-building is defined as the set of policies aimed at creating a common national identity and a sense of patriotism and loyalty towards the state.
Symbols and symbolism can play a crucial role in the nation-building process, and ruling elites often use them to motivate and mobilize their population (Smith 1998) . In this regard, the research is formed 5 by some basic assumptions underlying Pierre Bourdieu's theories on symbolic power. As Bourdieu (Bourdieu and Thompson 1991, 170) defines it, symbolic power is the power of "constituting the given through utterances, of making people see and believe […] an almost magical power which enables one to obtain the equivalent of what is obtained through force (whether physical or economic), by virtue of the specific effects of mobilization." Symbolic power is effective when complemented by misrecognition (méconnaissance) or, in other words, if the messages conveyed through words and slogans are considered legitimate by those who receive them (Bourdieu and Passeron 1977, 5) .
Recognizing the importance of symbolic power helps understanding how reality can be constructed using symbols and, in the specific case of the Rogun dam, how the realization of a mega dam can be used by a political elite to create an ideology that helps legitimize its actions, boost its popularity, and maintain power.
Indeed dams, and their ability to dominate nature by using its power to serve the needs of society, can have a strong symbolic value. Between the end of the nineteenth century and the 1970s, the socalled "hydraulic mission" to control nature and conquer the desert was launched worldwide, and some of the largest and most iconic dam projects were realized around the world, becoming highly symbolic both within the nation and outside (Frey 1993) . Examples are the Marathon dam, hailed as the greatest achievement of Greece after the Parthenon (Kaika 2006, 297) , and the massive Hoover Dam in Nevada, which led US Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes to declare upon completion: "pridefully, man acclaims his conquest of nature" (McCool 2012, 23) . Similarly, in 1954, at the inauguration of the high Bhakra dam, Prime Minister Jawahar Lal Nehru audaciously described dams as the "temples of modern India" 4 (Sharma 1989) . In Nasser's Egypt, the gigantic Aswan High Dam, completed in 1971 with Soviet support, became "the centrepiece of postwar nation making" in a country in which "large dams offered a way to build not just irrigation and power systems, but nation-states in themselves" (Mitchell 2002, 44-45) . John Waterbury (1979, 108) observed that as relations between Egypt and Britain deteriorated in the 1950s, "Nasser and his associates could no longer regard the dam as simply a big engineering project, but rather came to hold it up as the symbol of Egypt's will to resist imperialist endeavors to destroy the revolution." If, on the one side, those who supported the Aswan High Dam were treated as patriots, on the other side, those who criticized it were "thought of as subversive or even treasonous" (Waterbury 1979, 117 were accused by the local governor Tasso Jereissati of using "wicked insinuations and unfounded and unpatriotic criticisms."
Building dams can thus have a relevance to the nation-building process, also considering that Pal Kolstø (2000, 16) suggested that nation-building can be seen as an architectural metaphor which "implies the existence of consciously acting agents such as architects, engineers, carpenters, and the like." And as it was mentioned, this is also relevant to the Central Asian political setting, in which states created a legitimation framework through the invention of national symbols, in the form of "landslide electoral victories, Independence Day parades with displays of military might, historical writings, leaders' addresses to the nation, national holidays, flags and anthems, the currency, the capital and major national monuments" (Matveeva 2009 (Matveeva , 1101 . The main concern of Central Asian authoritarian rulers is to maintain power (Cummings 2002) , and a key way to do so without employing military force is to use symbols, since symbolism appears to have a crucial role in regional politics (Cummings 2010) . Also, as Murzakulova and Schoeberlein (2009) have illustrated, Central Asian political elites -particularly the presidents -placed great emphasis on the production of national ideologies that could provide them with legitimacy, and Central Asian states have been quite successful in retaining a monopoly over the production of symbols.
As a result, through the construction of a dam ideology, the Tajik political elite can gain legitimacy while diverting attention from more pressing matters and promising a better future to its population.
Furthermore, the Rogun dam and the Uzbek opposition to its construction can be used to strengthen a specific nationalistic propaganda. If a large dam symbolizes the nation, those who question it become the enemies of the nation. Therefore, the construction of a dam against the will of a neighboring country can be portrayed as a symbol of internal cohesion that incarnates the nation's right to selfdetermination.
Tajikistan and the Rogun dam
The Rogun dam was originally conceived by the Soviet Union in the 1960s as a dual-purpose structure for irrigation water management and for hydroelectricity. The project consists of a 335-meter high structure, a reservoir with a volume of 13.3 km 3 and six 600 megawatt (MW) turbines, resulting in a total installed capacity of 3,600 MW (Schmidt, 2007) . Compared with other dams, Rogun would be the tallest in the world -the fourth being Nurek (300-meter) -and the twentieth for installed capacity Paradoxically, even though Rogun used to be a Soviet project, its significance increased when the Soviet Union ceased to exist. With independence -and with the vanishing of the centralized Soviet management system responsible for the allocation of resources to the Soviet republics -energy-poor Tajikistan had to start paying for the imports of gas, oil and coal necessary to fulfill its energy needs.
However, the country's failure to pay for outstanding debts, combined with a tense relationship with In the same way, it is argued, the symbolic value that stems from the Rogun dam has become in recent years the centerpiece of an ideological production propagated by the government to legitimize itself, gain consensus and assert its regional power. The unifying effect of such an iconic project can contribute to the creation of a common national identity, while helping to keep President Rahmon and his close network from the Kulob region in power. If Rogun is seen as a symbol of patriotism and 9 success, it is understandable why the GoT wants it to be the tallest dam in the world. Having recently inaugurated the world's tallest flagpole and Central Asia's largest library (Parshin 2012) , the GoT seems to pay particular attention to world and regional records. While the project envisages a final height of 335-meter, alternatives for a lower dam were proposed over the years (Eschanov 2011 (Eschanov , 1582 .
The German engineering firm Lahmeyer, which was awarded a contract to carry out a first feasibility study of Rogun (Interfax 2005 through the lens of its symbolic significance. If, indeed, the GoT wants to persuade its citizens that the dam is a symbol of national pride and success, the power of suggestion that derives from a structure that stands taller than any other probably helps legitimize this message among those that receive it.
The internal Rogun discourse
The This notwithstanding, the Tajik government has continued to disseminate its Rogun discourse with frequent reports on TTFC, praising the progress made in realizing the dam. Yet, the parallel conflict with Uzbekistan (which resulted in the launch of the above mentioned feasibility study financed by the World Bank) led to a change in the Tajik framing of the Rogun dam, with an increasing emphasis placed on Tajikistan's sovereignty over its natural resources. As Rahmon (BBC Monitoring 2011a) observed in his annual state-of-the-nation address, water is part of Tajikistan's natural wealth, "it is our
national property, and we should fruitfully use it." The next section analyses this added dimension of the Rogun discourse, connecting it with the rivalry between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan and the Tajik portrayal of the dam as symbol of internal cohesion that epitomizes the nation's right to selfdetermination.
Internationalizing the Rogun discourse
The Uzbek opposition was successful in making the Rogun dam an internationally controversial matter. However, this has also had the unintended consequence of further convincing the Tajik government that the dam can be held up as a symbol of self-determination and success, one that can bond the people of Tajikistan around a national idea and against a common antagonist. Tajiks and Uzbeks share a common culture and traditions, and being the two main contemporary sedentary civilizations of Central Asia, they have also developed a fierce rivalry, one that was further exacerbated after the collapse of the Soviet Union due to the assignment of the cities of Samarkand and Bukhara to Uzbekistan. As Paul Bergne's (2007) historical analysis exhaustively illustrated, the birth of Tajikistan   9 in the 1920s caused a profound shift in the way the Tajiks saw themselves, creating a Tajik national identity where there previously was none. "The founding of Tajikistan was not the result of Tajik nationalism but the hour of its birth" (Lutz Rzehak quoted in Bergne 2007, 103) , and this new national identity almost immediately clashed with the Uzbek one. And indeed, the governments' claims about the existence of an ongoing Uzbek plot to weaken Tajikistan and its integrity as a nation gave rise to a developing Tajik nationalism (Heathershaw and Herzig 2013) . This is also mirrored in the discursive 13 constructions of the Rogun dam in which, unsurprisingly, the emphasis is placed on the nation as absolute sovereign and exclusive owner of its resources and territory.
The international dimension of the Rogun discourse is significant, since the projection of an international image is relevant to the nation and to the legitimation of an internal discourse (LeMarquand 1977; Frey 1993) . Successfully persuading the international community that Rogun is a cooperative project that represents a key step in the country's development path can help the Tajik government gain consent to, and possibly financial support for, its realization. A foreign policy issue assumes relevance as a national, if not nationalistic, assertion of power against a rival and an enemy of the nation, in a matter related with national pride rather than with the water of the Amu Darya river itself.
The Tajik government has consequently used the national media to contest and discredit the Uzbek (Aslov 2007; Rahmon 2008b Rahmon , 2009a Rahmon , 2009b . Tajikistan is presented as a benevolent country, one that "has all the rights to use its natural resources, including hydro-power, for the benefit of its people," and that sincerely advocates for mutually beneficial regional cooperation The president began to thank me for my 'excellent' newspaper article about Rogun. He explained the importance of the project for Tajikistan and said that it was incomprehensible to him why Uzbekistan's president was so opposed to it.
[…] President Rahmon suddenly lent forward and grabbed me tightly by the wrist. His face was only a few inches from mine. 'As you know I am coming to Strasbourg next week for meetings with the President of the European Parliament and for a debate with members of the Foreign Affairs Committee. I hope that I can meet you there, and I hope that you will repeat your support for our Rogun hydro project.' (Stevenson, 2012: 169-170) Stevenson's stance in favor of the Rogun dam -expressed also in his OSCE report (Stevenson 2011 ) -is regularly reported by the Tajik media. The words of the MEP are used to add credibility and back the Rogun discourse held by the Tajik government at the internal level. This is significant, as it marks the intimate correlation between the two dimensions of the discourse, both internal and international, which reciprocally create and sustain the elite discourse and its representation of the Rogun dam as a national symbol that epitomizes Tajikistan and its realisation as a nation.
Conclusions
In their seminal book, Eric Hobsbawm and John Ranger (1983) illustrated how traditions, nationalism and symbolism are often invented and constructed by ruling groups to legitimize their power. This seems to fit also the case illustrated above, and although the Rogun dam is far from completion, the discourse revolving around the necessity of its realization has already been well constructed by President Rahmon. In a strategy aimed at legitimizing its own hold on power, the Tajik government portrayed the dam as a central element in the country's nation-building process, one that symbolizes patriotism and a national identity. In line with this perspective, the construction of Rogun has thus been framed as a matter of national pride, a fundamental leap forward in national development, an existential achievement for the survival of the country, and ultimately, as a matter of life and death.
Even though Rahmon often declares that "achieving energy independence is the primary goal of Tajikistan's domestic policy, which will be achieved despite anything" (Interfax 2011), it seems that the construction of Rogun represents something that goes beyond the attainment of energy security.
Resembling other similar infrastructures that became the end in themselves, instead of the means to an end (Molle et al. 2009 ), Rogun epitomizes Rahmon's ambitions of building a national identity and asserting the interest of a sovereign country through a mega-structure. Its symbolic power is used to 16 construct not only a dam, but also, to say it as Bourdieu would, to construct a certain reality and establish a social order (Bourdieu and Thompson 1991) .
Whether by making a pitch for the dam at the UNGA, or by adding a national solidarity day for the construction of Rogun to the calendar, the efforts to create a Rogun ideology have been remarkable and heterogeneous. Overall, there seem to be two main Rogun meta-discourses, one for the domestic and one for the foreign dimension, both aimed at generating misrecognition and gaining consent: the main prerequisites to successfully impose an ideology and a worldview. The former presents the dam as a panacea, as a symbol of national pride and honor, of progress and prosperity, as a national idea that should permeate all Tajiks. The latter focuses on presenting Tajikistan to the international community as a responsible water user that should be allowed -and possibly, financially supported -to exercise its right of building a dam that will be operated for the mutual benefit of all the countries in the region.
Emblematically, at the most recent World Water Forum (held in France in 2012) the GoT disseminated brochures and pens uttering the message "Tajikistan is a water country," thus ideally concluding the process aimed at indissolubly binding the idea of Tajikistan with that of water, and at projecting this specific image of the country internationally. It is hard to say whether Rogun will ever be built or if the project will keep up with the government's high expectations. Nevertheless, the symbolic meaning that has been attached to the dam is such that it appears difficult to imagine the Tajik government giving up on the project any time soon. It would imply that Tajikistan, at least in the words of Rahmon, has also given up on its national idea.
